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Abstract
What obstacles prevent the most productive technologies from spreading to less developed
economies from the worlds technological frontier? In this paper, we seek to shed light on this
question by quantifying the geographic and human barriers to the transmission of technologies.
We argue that the intergenerational transmission of human traits, particularly culturally trans-
mitted traits, has led to divergence between populations over the course of history. In turn, this
divergence has introduced barriers to the di¤usion of technologies across societies. We provide
measures of historical and genealogical distances between populations, and document how such
distances, relative to the worlds technological frontier, act as barriers to the di¤usion of devel-
opment and of specic innovations. We provide an interpretation of these results in the context
of an emerging literature seeking to understand variation in economic development as the result
of factors rooted deep in history.
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1 Introduction
Technological di¤erences lie at the heart of di¤erences in economic performance across countries. A
large and growing literature on development accounting demonstrates that total factor productivity
accounts for a sizeable fraction of cross-country di¤erences in per capita income (Hall and Jones,
1999, Caselli, 2005, Hsieh and Klenow, 2010, among many others). The problem of low technological
advancement in poor countries is not primarily one of lack of innovation, for technologies that
could make these countries vastly richer exist and are used elsewhere in the world. A major
problem, instead, is one of delayed technological adoption. That many countries are subject to large
technological usage gaps is a well-documented phenomenon. However, the factors explaining delayed
technological adoption are not well-understood. What prevents the most productive technologies,
broadly understood, from spreading to less developed economies from the worlds technological
frontier? In this chapter, we seek to shed light on this question, by quantifying the geographic and
human barriers to the transmission of technologies.
We adopt a long-term perspective. The fortunes of nations are notoriously persistent through
time, and much of the variation in economic performance is rooted in deep history.1 While there
have been reversals of fortune at the level of countries, these reversals are much less prevalent
when looking at the fortunes of populations rather than those of geographic locations.2 Indeed,
contributions by Putterman and Weil (2010), Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) and Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009, 2012a, 2013) argue that the past history of populations is a much stronger pre-
dictor of current economic outcomes than the past history of given geographical locations. Thus,
any explanation for the slow and unequal di¤usion of frontier technologies must be able to account
for the persistence of economic fortunes over the long run. In this chapter, we argue that the
intergenerational transmission of human traits, particularly culturally transmitted traits, has led
to divergence between populations over the course of history. In turn, this divergence has intro-
duced barriers to the di¤usion of technologies across societies. These barriers impede the ow of
technologies in proportion to how genealogically distant populations are from each other.
1For instance, an important literature has explored the prehistoric origins of comparative development (Diamond,
1997; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005; Ashraf and Galor, 2011 and 2013a).
2See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) for the reversal of fortune at the level of geographic locations (for
former colonies), and papers by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Chanda, Cook and Putterman (2013) showing that
the reversal of fortune disappears when correcting for ancestry and expanding the sample beyond former colonies.
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Our starting point is to develop a theoretical model capturing these ideas. This model proceeds
in three phases. Firstly, we argue that genealogical separation across populations leads, on average,
to di¤erentiation along a wide range of traits transmitted from parents to children either biologically
or culturally. Populations that are genealogically distant should therefore also be distant in terms
of languages, norms, values, preferences, etc. - a set of traits we refer to as vertically transmitted
traits or more simply as vertical traits. Secondly, we consider the onset of a major innovation,
which could be interpreted as the Industrial Revolution, and argue that di¤erences in vertical
traits introduce barriers to the di¤usion of this major innovation across societies and populations.
Thus, cross-country di¤erences in aggregate TFP or per capita income should be correlated with
their genealogical distance. Finally, we extend the model to allow for innovations taking place over
time, and innovation and imitation occurring endogenously. In this more general framework, usage
lags in the adoption of specic technologies and consequently aggregate di¤erences in economic
development are correlated with average di¤erences in vertical traits, and thus with genealogical
distance.
We next turn to empirical evidence on these ideas. To measure the degree of relatedness
between populations, we use genetic distance. Data on genetic distance was gathered by population
geneticists specically for the purpose of tracing genealogical linkages between world populations
(Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994). By sampling large numbers of individuals from di¤erent populations,
these researchers obtained vectors of allele frequencies over a large set of genes, or loci. Measures of
average di¤erences between these vectors across any two populations provide a measure of genetic
distance. The measure we rely on, known as FST genetic distance, is the most widely used measure
in the population genetics literature because it has properties that make it well-suited to study
separation times between populations - precisely the concept we wish to capture. FST genetic
distance has been shown to correlate with other measures of cultural di¤erences such as linguistic
distance and di¤erences in answers to questions from the World Values Survey (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2009, Desmet, Le Breton, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber, 2011).
Emphatically, the purpose of our study is not to study any genetic characteristics that may
confer any advantage in development. The genes used in our measures of genealogical distance
purposedly do not capture any such traits. It is important to note that the genes chosen to compare
populations and retrace their genealogies are neutral (Kimura, 1968). That is, their spread results
from random factors and not from natural selection. For instance, neutral genes include those
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coding for di¤erent blood types, characteristics that are known not to have conferred a particular
advantage or disadvantage to individuals carrying them during human evolutionary history. The
mutations that give rise to specic alleles of these genes arise and spread randomly. The neutral
genes on which genetic distance is based thus do not capture traits that are important for tness
and survival. As a result, measures based on neutral genes are like a molecular clock: on average
they provide an indication of separation times between populations. Therefore, genetic distance can
be used as a summary statistics for all divergence in traits that are transmitted with variation from
one generation to the next over the long run, including divergence in cultural traits. Our hypothesis
is that, at a later stage, when such populations enter in contact with each other, di¤erences in those
traits create barriers to exchange, communication and imitation. These di¤erences could indeed
reect traits that are mostly transmitted culturally and not biologically - such as languages, norms
of behavior, values and preferences. In a nutshell, we hypothesize that genetic distance measured
from neutral genes captures divergence in intergenerationally transmitted traits - including cultural
traits - between populations. This divergence in turn impedes the ow of innovations.
We use these measures of genetic distance to test our model of technological di¤usion. Our
barriers model implies that the genetic distance measured relative to the world technological frontier
should trump absolute genetic distance as an explanation for bilateral income di¤erences. We nd
this to be the case empirically. Our model also implies that genetic distance relative to the frontier
should have predictive power for income di¤erences across time even in periods when the world
distribution of income was quite di¤erent from todays. We show indeed that the e¤ect of genetic
distance remains strong in historical data on population density and per capita income. Our model
implies that after a major innovation, such as the Industrial Revolution, the e¤ect of genealogical
distance should be pronounced, but that it should decline as more and more societies adopt the
frontiers innovation. This too is true empirically. Finally, our model implies that genetic distance
should have predictive power at the level of disaggregated technologies, and nd this to be the case
both historically (when measuring technological usage on the extensive margin) and for more recent
technological developments (measuring technological usage along the intensive margin). In sum,
we nd considerable evidence that barriers introduced by historical separation between populations
are central to account for the world distribution of income.
In the nal section of this chapter, we broaden our focus and place these hypotheses and
ndings in the context of the wider emerging literature on the deep historical roots of economic
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development. Our discussion starts from a taxonomy, based on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013),
describing how historically transmitted traits could conceivably a¤ect socio-economic outcomes.
The taxonomy distinguishes between the mode of transmission of vertical traits, and the mode of
operation of these traits. In principle, intergenerationally transmitted traits could be transmitted
either biologically or culturally. However, the recent development of the literatures on epigenetics
and on gene-culture interactions has made this distinction based on the mode of transmission much
less clear-cut empirically and conceptually. A more fruitful discussion, we argue, is to try to better
distinguish between the modes of operation of vertical traits. These traits, in principle, could
bear direct e¤ects on economic outcomes, or operate as barriers to economic interactions between
populations. We discuss existing contributions in light of this distinction, and discuss directions
for future research in the emerging new eld concerned with the deep historical roots of economic
development.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model of the di¤usion of
technologies as function of di¤erences in vertically transmitted traits across human populations, and
ultimately as a function of the degree of genealogical relatedness between them. Section 3 presents
our empirical methodology and data. Section 4 discusses a wide range of empirical results pertaining
to contemporaneous and historical measures of economic development and specic technology use
measures. Section 5 discusses the interpretation of these results in the context of the broader
literature on the deep roots of economic development. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Theory of Relatedness and Growth
In this section we present a basic theoretical framework to capture the links among genetic distance,
intergenerationally-transmitted traits, and barriers to the di¤usion of economic development across
di¤erent societies.3 The model illustrates two key ideas.
The rst idea is that genetic distance between populations captures the degree of genealogical
relatedness between populations over time, and can therefore be interpreted as a general metric
for average di¤erences in traits transmitted with variation across generations. Genetic distance
measures the di¤erence in gene distributions between two populations, where the genes under con-
sideration are neutral. By denition, neutral genetic change tends to occur randomly, independently
3The model builds on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009, 2012a).
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of selection pressure, and regularly over time, as in a molecular clock (Kimura, 1968). This diver-
gence provides information about lines of descent: populations that are closer in terms of genetic
distance have shared a common "ancestor population" more recently. The concept is analogous
to relatedness between individuals: two siblings are more closely related than two cousins because
they share more recent common ancestors: their parents rather than their grandparents. Since a
very large number of traits - not only biological but also cultural - are transmitted from one gener-
ation to the next over the long run, genetic distance provides a comprehensive measure for average
di¤erences in traits transmitted across generations. We call vertically transmitted traits (or vertical
traits, for short) the set of characteristics passed on across generations within a population over the
very long run - that is, over the time horizon along which populations have diverged (thousands of
years).4 Vertical transmission takes place across generations within a given population, and, in our
denition, includes not only direct parent-to-child transmission of biological and cultural traits,
but also, more broadly, "oblique" transmission of cultural traits from the older to the younger
within a genetically-related group. In contrast, we dene "horizontal transmission" as learning and
imitation across di¤erent populations at a point in time.
The second idea is that di¤erences in vertically transmitted traits act as barriers to horizontal
learning and imitation, and therefore hamper the di¤usion of innovations and economic development
across societies.5 We argue that populations that share a more recent common history, and are
therefore closer in terms of vertical traits, face lower costs and obstacles to adopting each others
innovations. This view that di¤erences in persistent societal characteristics may act as barriers
is consistent with a large literature on the di¤usion of innovations, starting with the classic work
by Rogers (1962). Empirically, we are interested primarily in the di¤usion of modern economic
development in historical times, and especially after the Industrial Revolution, so our stylized
model is designed with that objective in mind.
4This terminology is borrowed from the evolutionary literature on cultural transmission (for example, see Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005).
5Policy-induced barriers to the di¤usion of technology are analyzed by Parente and Prescott (1994, 2002). In our
framework we interpret barriers more broadly to include all long-term societal di¤erences that are obstacles to the
di¤usion of development.
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2.1 Genetic Distance and Vertically Transmitted Traits
We model all vertical traits of a population as a point on the real line: each population i has
vertical traits vi, where vi is a real number. At time o ("origin"), there exists only one population
(population 0), with traits normalized to zero: v0 = 0. At time p > o ("prehistory"), the original
population splits into two populations (1 and 2). At time h > p ("history"), each of the two
populations splits into three separate populations: population 1 into populations 1:1, 1:2, 1:3, and
population 2 into populations 2:1; 2:2, and 2:3.6 The genealogical tree is displayed in Figure 1. By
analogy with the genealogy of individuals, we say that populations such as 1:1 and 1:2 are "sibling"
populations, because their last common ancestors (their "parent" population) can be found at the
more recent split (time p), while population pairs such as 1:2 and 2:1 are "cousin" populations,
because their last common ancestors (their "grandparent" population) must be traced back to a
more remote time o < p. G(i; j) denotes the genetic distance between population i and population
j.7 The genetic distance between two sibling populations is gs > 0, while the genetic distance
between two cousin populations is gc > gs: Formally,
G(1:m; 1:n) = G(2:m; 2:n) = gs where m = 1; 2; 3; n = 1; 2; 3 and 1:m 6= 1:n ; 2:m 6= 2:n (1)
and
G(1:m ; 2:n) = gc where m = 1; 2; 3 and n = 1; 2; 3 (2)
Each population inherits vertical traits from its ancestor population with variation. In general,
vertical traits vd of population d (the "descendent"), descending from population a (the "ancestor"),
are given by:
vd = va + "d (3)
where "d is a shock. In particular, we model the process of variation as a random walk. This
simplication is consistent with the molecular-clock interpretation of genetic distance. While more
complex processes could be considered, this formalization has two advantages: it is economical and
illustrates how random changes are su¢ cient to generate our theoretical predictions. Formally, we
assume that "d takes value " > 0 with probability 1=2 and  " with probability 1=2. We denote with
6 In Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), we presented a similar model with only four populations at time h (1:1, 1:2,
2:1, and 2:2). Here we extend the framework to allow for a more general analysis, in which we also have pairs of
populations that, while they are not at the frontier themselves, are both siblings with the frontier population.
7By dention, G(i; i) = 0.
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V (i; j) the distance in vertically transmitted traits (vertical distance, for short) between populations
i and j:
V (i; j)  jvj   vij (4)
We are now ready to summarize our rst idea as:
Proposition 1
The distance in vertical traits V (i; j) between two populations i and j is, on average, increasing
in their genetic distance G(i; j).
Derivation of Proposition 1:
The expected distance in vertical traits between sibling populations is:
EfV (i; j) j G(i; j) = gsg = " (5)
because their vertical distance is equal to 2" with probability 1=2; when one population experiences
a positive shock " and the other a negative shock  ", and equal to 0 with probability 1=2, when
both populations experience the same shock (either " with probability 1=4 or  " with probability
1=4). In contrast, the expected distance in vertical traits between cousin populations is:
EfV (i; j) j G(i; j) = gcg = 3"
2
(6)
because their vertical distance is 0 with probability 3=8, 2" with probability 1=2, and 4" with
probability 1=8.8 Therefore, the expected distance in vertical traits is increasing in genetic distance:
EfV (i; j) j G(i; j) = gcg   EfV (i; j) jG(i; j) = gsg = "
2
> 0 (7)
8The details of the calculation are as follows. With probability 1=4, the two populations experienced identical
shocks at time h, and their respective ancestor populations experienced identical shocks at time p, implying V (i; j) = 0.
With probability 1=8; one population lineage experienced a positive shock " at time p and a negative shock  " at
time h while the other population lineage experienced  " and ";implying again V (i; j) = 0. With probability 1=4,
the two populationsancestors experienced identical shocks at time p, but the two populations experienced di¤erent
shocks at time h, implying V (i; j) = 2". With probability 1=4; the shocks were the same at time h but di¤erent at
time p, also implying V (i; J) = 2": Finally, with probability 1=8, one population linaeage experienced two positive
shocks ("+ " = 2") and the other two negative shocks ( "  " =  2"), therefore leading to a vertical distance equal
to 4": In sum, their expected vertical distance is given by EfV (i; j)jG(i; j) = gcg = 380 + 122"+ 184" =
3"
2
:
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It is important to notice that the relation between distance in vertical traits and genetic distance
is is not deterministic, but works on average. Some pairs of populations, while genealogically more
distant, may end up with more similar vertical traits than two more closely related populations.
However, that outcome is less likely to be observed than the opposite. On average, genetic distance
and vertical distance go hand in hand.
2.2 Barriers to the Di¤usion of Economic Development
Our second idea is that di¤erences in vertical traits constitute barriers to the spread of innovations
across populations. A stylized illustration of this idea is provided below.
At time p all populations produce output using the basic technology Yi = ALi, so that all
populations have the same income per capita y = A. In period h a population happens to nd
a more productive technology A0 = A +  where  > 0. We abstract from the possibility that
the likelihood of nding the innovation is itself a function of a societys vertical traits. Such direct
e¤ects of vertical traits could strengthen the links between genetic distance and economic outcomes,
but are not necessary for our results.
We denote the innovating population as f (for technological frontier). To x ideas and without
loss of generality, in the rest of the analysis we assume that population 1:1 is the frontier population
(f = 1:1). Populations farther from population f in terms of vertical traits face higher barriers
to adopt the new technology. Formally, we assume that a society i at a vertical distance from the
frontier equal to V (i; f) can improve its technology only by:
i = [1  V (i; f)] (8)
where the parameter  > 0 captures the barriers to the horizontal di¤usion of innovations due
to distance in vertical traits. To ensure non-negativity, we assume that   1
maxV (i; f)
=
1
4"
.9
Therefore, income per capita in society i will be given by:
yi = A+ i = A+ [1  V (i; f)] (9)
This immediately implies:
Proposition 2
9Alternatively, the formula could be re-written as i = maxf[1  V (i; f)]; 0g:
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The di¤erence in income per capita jyi   yj j between society i and society j is a function of
their relative vertical distance from the frontier jV (i; f)  V (j; f)j:
jyj   yij = jV (i; f)  V (j; f)j (10)
2.3 Genetic Distance and Income Di¤erences
Since income di¤erences are associated with di¤erences in vertical traits across populations (Propo-
sition 2), and di¤erences in vertical traits, on average, go hand in hand with genetic distance (Propo-
sition 1), we can now establish a link between expected income di¤erences and genetic distance.
These links are formally derived as Propositions 3 and 4 below.
Proposition 3
The expected income di¤erence Efjyj   yijg between societies i and j is increasing in their
genetic distance G(i; j).
Derivation of Proposition 3:
First, we must calculate the expected income of all pairs of populations at genetic distance
gs (sibling populations). V (i; j) between two sibling populations is 0 with probability 1=2 and 2"
with probability 1=2. When the two populations have identical traits, they have identical incomes.
When they are at a distance 2" from each other, one of them must be closer to the frontiers traits
by a distance equal to 2", no matter where the frontiers traits are located (at 0, 2", or  2"), or
whether one of the two sibling populations is the frontier. Thus, when V (i; j) = 2", the income
di¤erence between the two populations is 2". In sum, for all pairs of sibling populations is
jyk:m   yk:nj = 0 with probability 1=2 , and jyk:m   yk:nj = 2" with probability 1=2, implying
Efjyk:m   yk:njg = " where k = 1; 2; m = 1; 2; 3;n = 1; 2; 3;and m 6= n. Consequently, the
expected income di¤erence between sibling populations is:
Efjyj   yij jj G(i; j) = gsg = " (11)
Now, we must calculate the expected income di¤erence between cousin populations. V (i; j) between
two cousin populations is 0 with probability 3=8, 2" with probability 1=2, and 4" with probability
1=8. The calculation is slightly more complicated, because we must distinguish between pairs that
include the frontier and pairs that do not include the frontier f = 1:1. First, consider pairs that
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include the frontier. With probability 3=8 a population 2:n shares the same traits (and hence
income) with the frontier, with probability 1=2, population 2:n has income lower than the frontiers
by 2", and with probability 1=8 population 2:ns income is lower by 4": Thus, we have:
Efjyf   y2:njg = 2"
2
+
4"
8
=
3"
2
where n = 1; 2; 3 (12)
Now, consider pairs of cousin populations that do not include the frontier population - that is, pairs
1:m and 2:n, with m = 2; 3, and n = 1; 2; 3. Again, the income di¤erence between each pair of
cousin populations is equal to zero when both populations share the same traits (which happens
with probability 3=8), and is equal to 2" when their traits are at a distance 2" from each other
(which happens with probability 1=2), no matter where the frontier is located. However, when the
two cousin populations are at a distance 4" from each other (which happens with probability 1=8),
their income distance depends on the location of the traits of the frontier. If the frontier is at an
extreme (either 2" or -2"  an event with probability 1=2), the 4" vertical distance between 1:m
and 2:n implies that their income distance is equal to 4": In contrast, if the frontiers traits are
at 0 (also an event with probability 1=2), 1:m and 2:n are equally distant from the frontier (each
at a distance 2"), and therefore have identical incomes per capita. In sum, we have:
Efjy1:m   y2:njg = 2"
2
+
1
2
4"
8
=
5"
4
where m = 2; 3; n = 1; 2; 3 (13)
Consequently, expected income di¤erence between pairs of cousin populations is:
Efjyj   yij jj G(i; j) = gcg = 1
9
3X
m=1
3X
n=1
Efjy1:m   y2:njg = 1
9
[3
3"
2
+ 6
5"
4
] =
4"
3
(14)
Therefore, the expected income di¤erence between cousin populations is higher than the one be-
tween sibling populations: higher genetic distance is associated, on average, with higher income
di¤erences, as stated in Proposition 3. Formally:
Efjyj   yij jj G(i; j) = gcg   Efjyj   yij jj G(i; j) = gsg = "
3
> 0 (15)
Why do populations which are genetically more distant from each other tend to di¤er more in
income per capita, on average? The reason is that populations which are distant from each other
genetically are also more likely to nd themselves at more di¤erent distances from the frontier.
Relative distance from the frontier, rather than genetic distance between populations per se, is the
key determinant of expected income di¤erences. Therefore, we can nd an even stronger relation
between income di¤erences and genetic distance if we consider not the absolute genetic distance
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between two populations G(i; j), but their relative genetic distance from the technological frontier,
dened as follows:
R(i; j)  jG(i; f) G(j; f)j (16)
Our model predicts that the e¤ect of relative genetic distance on income di¤erences is not only
positive, but also larger than the e¤ect of absolute genetic distance:
Proposition 4
The expected income di¤erence Efjyj   yijg between society i and j is increasing in the two
populationsrelative genetic distance from the frontier R(i; j). The e¤ect of relative genetic distance
R(i; j) on income di¤erences is larger than the e¤ect of absolute genetic distance G(i; j).
Derivation of Proposition 4:
The expected income di¤erence between pairs of populations at relative genetic distanceR(i; j) =
gs is10:
Efjyj   yij jj R(i; j) = gsgj = Efjyf   y1:2jg+ Efjyf   y1:3jg = " (17)
while the expected income di¤erence between pairs of populations at relative genetic distance
R(i; j) = gc is11:
Efjyj   yij jjR(i; j) = gcgj = 1
3
3X
n=1
Efjyf   y2:njg = 3"
2
(18)
Therefore, the e¤ect of an increase of relative genetic distance from gs to gc is
Efjyj   yij jj R(i; j) = gcg   Efjyj   yij jj R(i; j) = gsg = "
2
>
"
3
> 0 (19)
The e¤ect is positive (
"
2
> 0), and larger than the analogous e¤ect of absolute genetic distance
(
"
3
), derived above.
By the same token, the e¤ect of relative genetic distance on expected income di¤erences is also
positive when moving from R(i; j) = gc   gs to R(i; j) = gc:
Efjyj   yij jj R(i; j) = gcg   Efjyj   yij jj R(i; j) = gc   gsg = 3"
2
  5"
4
=
"
4
> 0 (20)
10We use the result, derived above, that all expected income di¤erences between siblings are equal to ":
11We use the result, derived above, that the expected income di¤erence between the frontier and each of its cousing
populations is
3"
2
:
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The results above are intuitive. As we increase relative genetic distance from the frontier, the
expected income gap increases. The size of the e¤ect is a positive function of the extent of divergence
in vertically transmitted traits ("), the extent to which this divergence constitutes a barrier to the
horizontal di¤usion of innovations (), and the size of the improvement in productivity at the
frontier ().
In summary, our model has the following testable implications, which are brought to the data
in the empirical analysis carried in the rest of this chapter:
1. Relative genetic distance from the frontier population is positively correlated with di¤erences
in income per capita.
2. The e¤ect on income di¤erences associated with relative genetic distance from the frontier
population is larger than the e¤ect associated with absolute genetic distance.
2.4 A Dynamic Extension
In the stylized model above, for simplicity we assumed that only one big innovation took place at
time h. We now present a dynamic example, where innovations take place over time, and innovation
and imitation are modeled endogenously.12 The key insights and results carry over to this extension.
In this dynamic example we assume, for simplicity, that populations do not change in modern
times and have xed size (normalized to one). More importantly, we assume that their inherited
vertical traits do not change over the relevant time horizon. This is a reasonable simplication,
because changes in vertical traits tend to take place much more slowly and at a longer horizon than
the spread of technological innovations, especially if we focus on modern economic growth. Adding
small random shocks to vertical traits after time h would signicantly complicate the algebra, but
would not a¤ect the basic results.
Consider our six populations (i = 1:1; 1:2; 1:3; 2:1; 2:2; 2:3), with vertical traits inherited from
their ancestral populations as described above, and unchanged in modern times (i.e., for t  h):
Time is continuous. Consumers in economy i at time t maximize:
Ui(t) =
Z 1
s
ln ci(s)e
 (t s)ds (21)
under a standard budget constraint, where ci(t) is consumption, and  > 0 is the subjective discount
rate. We assume that the six economies are not nancially integrated, and that each economy i
12The model builds heavily on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997, 2003) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2012a).
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has its own real interest rate, denoted by ri(t): Hence, the optimal growth rate of consumption in
society i is:
dci
dt
1
ci(t)
= ri(t)   (22)
The production function for nal output yi(t) is:
yi(t) =
Z Ai(t)
0
[xzi(t)]
dz; 0 <  < 1 (23)
where xzi(t) is the quantity of intermediate good of type z employed at time t in economy i, and
the interval [0; Ai(t)] measures the continuum of intermediate goods available in economy i at time
t. Each intermediate good is produced by a local monopolist.
As before, without loss of generality we assume that society 1:1 is the technological frontier
(f = 1:1). In this setting, this means that Af (h) > Ai(h) for all i 6= f: However, unlike in the
previous analysis, innovation at the frontier economy now takes place endogenously. Following
Barro and Salai-Martin (1997 and 2003, chapters 6 and 8), we assume that the inventor of input
z retains perpetual monopoly power over its production within the frontier economy. The inventor
sells the intermediate good at price Pz = 1=, earning the prot ow  = (1   )(1+)=(1 ) at
each time t:
The cost of inventing a new intermediate good at the frontier is  units of nal output. Free
entry into the innovation sector implies that the real interest rate rf (t) must be equal to =, which
is assumed to be larger than , therefore implying that consumption grows at the constant rate:
  

   > 0 (24)
Output yf (t) and the frontier level of intermediate goods Af (t) will also grow at the rate .
The other populations cannot use the intermediate goods invented in economy f directly, but,
as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), must pay an imitation cost i in order to adapt those
intermediate goods to local conditions. Our key assumption is that the imitation costs are increasing
in the distance in vertical traits between the imitator and the frontier. Specically, we assume that
society is imitation cost is:
i(t) = e
V (i;f)

Ai(t)
Af (t)

(25)
This is an instance of our general idea: a higher V (i; f) is associated with higher imitation costs,
because di¤erences in vertical traits between the imitator and the inventor act as barriers to adop-
tion and imitation. The parameter  captures the extent to which dissimilarity in vertical traits
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between imitator and inventor increases imitation costs. For a given vertical distance, an imitator
in society i faces lower imitation costs when there is a larger set of intermediate goods available
for imitation - that is, when Ai(t)=Af (t) is low. The rationale for this assumption is the usual
one: intermediate goods that are easier to imitate are copied rst. Hence, the parameter  > 0
captures this advantage from technological backwardness. Our perspective may indeed shed some
light on whether backward economies face higher or lower imitation costs overall, an issue debated
in the literature (for instance, see Fagerberg, 2004). As we will see, our model predicts that, in
steady state, societies that are farther technologically, and should therefore face lower imitation
costs for this reason (captured by the parameter ), are also farther in terms of vertical distance
from the frontier, and hence should face higher imitation costs through this channel (captured by
the parameter ), with conicting e¤ects on overall imitation costs.
Again, we assume that an imitator who pays cost i(t) to imitate good k has perpetual monopoly
power over the production of that input in economy i, and charges Pk = 1=; earning the prot
ow  = (1   )(1+)=(1 ), while output is proportional to available intermediate goods Ai(t)
in equilibrium: yi(t) = 2=(1 )Ai(t): With free entry into the imitation sector, economy is real
interest rate in equilibrium is13:
ri(t) =

i(t)
+
di
dt
1
i(t)
(26)
In steady state, the level of imitation costs i is constant. The number of intermediate goods,
output and consumption in all economies grow at the same rate  as at the frontier. Therefore,
in steady state the real interest rates in all economies are identical and equal to


, and imitation
costs are identical for all imitators, which implies:
Proposition 2bis
The di¤erence in log of income per capita in steady state j ln yi   ln yj j between society i and
society j is a function of their relative vertical distance from the frontier jV (i; f)  V (j; f)j :14
j ln yi   ln yj j =


jV (i; f)  V (j; f)j (27)
The intuition of the above equation is straightforward: long-term di¤erences in total factor pro-
ductivity and output between societies are an increasing function of their relative cost to imitate,
13See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997, 2003) for the details of the derivation.
14Of course we also have j lnAi (t)  lnAj (t)j = j ln yi (t)  ln yj (t)j
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which depends on their relative vertical distance from the frontier. Therefore, societies that are
more distant from the frontier in terms of vertically transmitted traits will have lower incomes per
capita in steady state.
This dynamic model conrms the key implications of the simplied model that we had presented
before. In particular, the equivalents of Propositions 3 and 4 hold in this setting as well, as long as
one substitutes income di¤erences jyj yij with di¤erences in log of income per capita in steady state
j ln yi   ln yj j, and  with


: We can then re-interpret those results as implying that societies at
di¤erent relative genetic distance from the technological frontier will have di¤erent levels of income
per capita in steady state. The e¤ect of relative genetic distance on the income gap is larger when
di¤erences in vertical traits are associated with higher imitation costs (higher ). Interestingly, we
also have that the e¤ect of relative genetic distance on income di¤erences is lower when there are
larger benets from technological backwardness (higher ). In sum, the e¤ects of relative genetic
distance on economic development extend to this dynamic setting.
3 Empirical Methodology and Data
3.1 Specication and Estimation
The starting points for our empirical investigation into the long-term barriers to economic devel-
opment are Propositions 3 and 4. These theoretical results show that if di¤erences in vertical
traits act as barriers to the di¤usion of technologies, then di¤erences in measures of development
or technological sophistication across pairs of countries should 1) be correlated with the absolute
genetic distance between these countries, 2) be correlated more strongly with their genetic distance
relative to the technological frontier and 3) genetic distance relative to the frontier should trump
simple genetic distance between two countries. Whether these patterns hold true constitutes an
empirical test of the barriers model. Denote by Di a measure of development or technological so-
phistiction in country i. We will consider alternatively per capita income (for the modern period),
population density (for the pre-Industrial period) and direct measures of technology use, to be
further detailed below. Denote by FSTWij the absolute genetic distance between countries i and j.
Analogous to the theoretical denition, genetic distance relative to the frontier country is dened
as: FSTRij = jFSTWif   FSTWjf j where f denotes the frontier country.
Then the empirical predictions of Propositions 3 and 4 lead to the following empirical speci-
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cations:
jDi  Dj j = 0 + 1FSTRij + 02Xij + "ij (28)
jDi  Dj j = 0 + 1FSTWij + 02Xij + "ij (29)
jDi  Dj j = 0 + 1FSTRij + 2FSTWij + 03Xij + "ij (30)
where Xij is a vector of control variables, primarily composed of alternative sources of barriers to
di¤usion, primarily geographic barriers. The predictions of our model are that 1 > 0; 1 > 0,
1 > 1; 1 > 0 and 2 = 0.
Equations (28), (29) and (30) are estimated using least squares. However, an econometric
concern arises from the construction of the left-hand side variable as the di¤erence in development
or technological sophistication across country pairs. Indeed, consider pairs (i; j) and (i; k). By
construction, the log per capita income of country i appears in the di¤erence in log per capita
incomes of both pairs, introducing some spatial correlation in the error term. To deal with this
issue, we correct the standard errors using two-way clustering, developed by Cameron, Gelbach
and Miller (2006). Specically, standard errors are clustered at the level of country 1 and country
2. This results in larger standard errors compared to no clustering.15
We complement these tests with additional empirical results that can shed light on our barriers
interpretation of the e¤ect of genetic distance. In particular, we examine the evolution of the
e¤ect of genetic distance through time. If genetic distance continues to have an e¤ect on di¤erencs
in economic performance in periods where the world distribution of income was very di¤erent, it
should put to rest the idea that vertically transmitted traits bear direct, unchanged e¤ects on
productivity. We therefore examine the e¤ects of genetic distance on population density in the
pre-industrial era, going as far back as year 1. In Malthusian times, population density is the
proper measure of overall technological sophistication, since per capita income gains resulting from
innovation are only transitory, and soon dissipated by an increase in fertility (Ashraf and Galor,
2011 provide empirical evidence on this point). We also study the time path of the e¤ect of genetic
distance around the Industrial Revolution. Our model predicts that this e¤ect should peak during
the initial phases of the di¤usion of the Industrial Revolution, as only places close to its birthplace
15 In past work, we employed various methods to deal with the spatial correlation that arises as a byproduct of the
construction of the left-hand side variable, such as including a set of common country dummies. The results were not
sensitive to the method used to control for spatial correlation. See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) for further details.
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have adopted the new innovation. The model predicts that the e¤ect should decline thereafter, as
more and more societies adopt industrial and post-industrial modes of production.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Genetic distance data
Our source for genetic distance data is Cavalli Sforza et al. (1994). The main dataset covers
42 ethnolinguistic groups samples across the globe.16 The genetic data concerns 120 gene loci,
for which allele frequencies were obtained by population. The gene loci were chosen to represent
neutral genes, i.e. genes that did not spread through natural selection but through random drift, as
determined by geneticists. Thus, when aggregated over many genes, measures of genetic distance
obtained from neutral genes capture separation times between populations, precisely the analog of
genealogical distance employed in our theoretical model.
The specic measure of genetic distance we use is known as FST genetic distance, also known
as Wrights xation index.17 To illustrate the index, we derive it for the specic case of two
populations, one locus and two alleles. The number of individuals in population i is ni. Total
population is n =
P2
i=1 ni. The share of population i is wi = ni=n. Consider one locus with
two possible alleles: either Q or q. Let 0  pi  1 be the frequency of individuals in population
i with allele Q: Let p be this frequency in the whole population

p =
P2
i=1wipi

. The degree
of heterozygosity (i.e. the probability that two randomly selected alleles within a population are
di¤erent) within population i is Hi = 2pi(1   pi), and average heterozygosity across populations
is HS =
P2
i=1wiHi. Heterozygosity for the whole population is HT = 2p(1   p). Then Wrights
xation index, FST , is dened as:
FST = 1  HS
HT
= 1  n1p1(1  p1) + n2p2(1  p2)
np(1  p) (31)
This is one minus the ratio of group level average heterozygosity to total heterozygosity. If both
populations have the same allele frequencies (p1 = p2), then Hi = HS = HT , and FST = 0. In
the polar opposite case, individuals within each population all have the same alleles, and these
16We will also make use of a more detailed dataset covering 26 European populations. Since populations were
sampled at the country level rather than at the ethnic group level for the European dataset, matching populations
to countries was an easier task.
17 In past work, we also used the Nei index. Results did not hinge on the use of either index.
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alleles di¤er completely across groups (p1 = 1   p2). Then FST = 1 (total xation). In general,
the higher the di¤erences in allele frequencies across populations, the higher is FST . The formula
can easily be extended to account for more than two alleles. FST can be averaged in a variety of
ways across loci, so that the resulting FST distance is a summary measure of relatedness between
the two populations. Moreover, boostrapping techniques can be used to obtain standard errors on
estimates of FST . Details of these extensions are provided in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994, pp. 26-27).
We rely on the genetic distance data that they provide, i.e. we rely on population geneticistsbest
judgment as to the proper choice of alleles, the proper sampling methods, and the proper way to
aggregate heterozygosity across alleles.
The genealogical tree of human populations is displayed in Figure 2, where the genetic distance
data was used to construct a tree showing the successive splits between human populations over
the course of the last 70; 000 years or so. In this gure, recent splits indicate a low genetic distance
between the corresponding populations. In the source data pertaining to 42 world populations,
the largest FST genetic distance between any two populations is between the Mbuti Pygmies and
the Papua New Guineans (FST = 0:4573). The smallest is between the Danish and the English
(FST = 0:0021).
Genetic distance is obtained at the level of populations but it was necessary to construct mea-
sures pertaining to countries. We matched ethnolinguistic groups in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) to
ethnic groups for each country using the ethnic group data from Alesina et al. (2003), and then
constructed the expected distance between two individuals, each drawn randomly from each of the
two countries in a pair. Thus, our baseline measure of genetic distance between countries 1 and 2
is:
FSTW12 =
IX
i=1
JX
j=1
(s1i  s2j  FSTij) (32)
where s1i is the share of population i in country 1, s2j is the share of population j in country 2, and
FSTij is genetic distance between population i and j. This index is also known as the Greenberg
index (after Greenberg, 1956), and is increasingly used in economics as a measure of ethnolinguistic
heterogeneity (see for instance Bossert, DAmbrosio and La Ferrara, 2011).18
The measure derived above, FSTW12 , is the absolute measure of expected distance between any
18 In past work we also used the genetic distance between the largest populations (i.e. genetic groups) in countries
1 and 2. The correlation between expected (weighted) genetic distance and this alternative index is very high, and it
does not matter which one we use in our empirical work.
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two countries 1 and 2. In keeping with the theoretical denition, we can also dene a measure of
these countriesrelative distance to the technological frontier f :
FSTR12 = jFSTW1f   FSTW2f j (33)
Finally, the procedure above matches populations to ethnolinguistic groups as they occur in the
contemporary period. It is, however, also possible to calculate genetic distance as of the year 1500
AD, by matching populations to the plurality group in each country given their composition in 1500.
Thus, for instance, in the 1500 match, Australia is matched to the Aborigenes population (while
for the contemporary period Australia is matched to a combination of English and Aborigenes -
predominantly the former). We make use of the 1500 match in some historical regressions, or as
an instrument for contemporary genetic distance. Again, measures of absolute and relative genetic
distance are computed using the 1500 match of populations to countries.
3.2.2 Measures of development and technological sophistication
We use a variety of measures of di¤erences in economic development and technological sophisti-
cation. The rst set of measures is dened at an aggregate level. The primary measure for the
contemporary period is the absolute di¤erence in log per capita income in 2005 (from the Penn
World Tables version 6.3). For the pre-industrial periods, we consider the absolute di¤erence in
population density. The population density data pertains to the year 1500, and the source is
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Despite more limited geographic coverage, we also use data on per
capita income going back to 1820, from Maddison (2003), in order to examine the time path of the
e¤ect of genetic distance around the time of the Industrial Revolution.
The second set of measures includes disaggregated measures of technology usage, either along
the extensive margin (for the historical period) or along the intensive margin (for the contemporary
period).19 We rely mostly on data from Easterly, Comin and Gong (2010, henceforth CEG). CEG
gathered data on the degree of technological sophistication for the years 1000 BC, 1 AD, 1500
AD and the contemporary period (1970-2000 AD). We make use of the data for 1500 AD and the
contemporary period, since this corresponds most closely to the available genetic distance data.
The data for 1500 pertain to the extensive margin of adoption of 24 separate technologies, grouped
into 5 categories: military, agricultural, transportation, communication and industry. For each
19These technologies are listed in Appendix 1.
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technology in each category, a country is given a score of 1 if the technology was in use in 1500,
0 otherwise. The scores are summed within categories, and rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. An
overall index of technological sophistication is also obtained by taking the simple average of the
technological index for each of the 5 categories.
For the 1970-2000 AD data, technology usage is measured along the intensive margin. The
basic data covers the per capita usage intensity of nine technologies, obtained from the database of
Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2008). For each technology, a countrys usage is characterized as the
number of years since the technological frontier (the United States) had the same level of per capita
usage. The index is then rescaled to vary from 0 to 1, where 1 denotes usage at the same level as
the frontier. Technologies are aggregated into 4 of the 5 aforementioned categories (all except the
military category), and a simple average of the four measures is also available.
Finally, we attempted to measure technological sophistication at a more disaggregated level.
This allows for a more rened analysis based on individual technologies that were not aggregated
into broader categories, as is the case in the CEG dataset. For this, we relied on the CHAT dataset
(Comin and Hobijn, 2009), which contains data on usage of 100 technologies. We restricted atten-
tion to technologies for which data is available for at least 50 countries over the 1990-1999 period.
This led to a restricted set of 33 technologies, covering a wide range of sectors - medical, trans-
portation, communications, industrial and agricultural technologies. For each of the underlying
33 technologies, we calculated usage per capita, in order to maintain a consistent denition of the
intensity of use.20 For instance, for the technology "personal computers", the dependent variable
is the absolute di¤erence, between country i and country j, in the number of computers per capita.
For all technologies, the technological leader was assumed to be the United States, an assumption
conrmed in virtually all cases when examining the actual intensity of use.
All of these measures of technological sophistication were available at the country level, so we
computed the absolute di¤erence in technology measures across all available pairs of countries for
the purpose of empirical analysis.
20One exception was for the share of cropland area planted with modern varieties, for which it would make little
sense to divide by population. All other technologies were entered in per capita terms.
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3.2.3 Measures of geographic barriers
Measures of genetic distance are correlated with geographic distance. Indeed, Homo sapiens is
estimated to have migrated out of East Africa around 70,000 years ago, and from there spread
rst to Asia, and then later fanned out to Europe, Oceania, and the Americas. As early humans
split into subgroups, the molecular clock of genetic drift started operating, and populations became
more genetically distant. It is not surprising that the farther in space, the more genetically distant
populations are expected to be. It is therefore important to control for geographic distance when
estimating the human barriers to the di¤usion of innovations. At the same time, as we describe
below, the correlation between geographic distance and genetic distance is not as large as one might
expect. This is the case for two major reasons: First, genetic drift occurred along rather specic
geographic axes. For instance, a major dimension along which populations array themselves in
proportion to their genetic distance is a rough straight line between Addis Ababa and Beijing.
There need not be a strict correspondence, then, between genetic distance and common measures
of geographic distance relevant as geographic barriers to the spread of innovations, such as the
greater circle distance or latitudinal distance. Second, more recent population movements have
served to break the initial links between geographic distance and genetic distance. Two highly
relevant population movements were the conquests of parts of the New World by Europeans, and
the slave trades occuring thereafter. We obtain some (but not all) of our identifying variation o¤
of these post-1500 population movements.
To capture geographic distance we use a large array of controls, capturing both simple geodesic
distance, distance along the longitudinal and latitudinal dimensions, and binary indicators of micro-
geography such as whether the countries in a pair are contiguous, are islands, are landlocked, or
share a common sea or ocean. This set of controls was included in every regression, and was
supplemented in robustness tests by additional geographic controls such as climatic di¤erences,
continent e¤ects and freight costs.
3.2.4 Summary statistics and data patterns
Figure 3 presents a simple plot of weighted genetic distance to the USA against per capita in-
come, and Figure 4 does the same after partialling out the e¤ect of geodesic distance (a similar
gure obtains after partialling out the e¤ect of a longer list of geographic distance metrics). Both
gures reveal a negative association between per capita income and genetic distance to the USA.
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Table 1 presents summary statistics to help in the interpretation of regression estimates. Panel
B displays correlations based on 10; 440 country pairs, based on 145 countries. These correlations
are informative: the absolute genetic distance between pairs bears a correlation of 19:5% with the
absolute di¤erence in log per capita income. Genetic distance relative to the USA, however, bears a
much larger correlation of 32:26%, a pattern consistent with the predictions of the barriers model,
implying a larger e¤ect of relative genetic distance compared to absolute genetic distance. Finally,
as mentioned above, the correlation between genetic distance (either relative to the frontier or
not) with geodesic distance is positive but moderate in magnitude, o¤ering hope that the e¤ect of
genealogical barriers can be estimated separately from that of geographic barriers.
4 Barriers to Development: Empirical Results
4.1 Results for Aggregate Measures of Economic Development
4.1.1 Baseline estimates
Baseline estimates of equations (28), (29) and (30) are presented in Table 2. The predictions of
the barriers model are borne out: after controlling for various measures of geographic distance,
di¤erences in per capita income are signicantly correlated with both absolute and relative genetic
distance (columns 1 and 2).21 However, the magnitude of the e¤ect of genetic distance relative to
the technological frontier (column 1) is about three times as large as the e¤ect of absolute genetic
distance (column 2). This is true when comparing both the estimated coe¢ cient and a standardized
measure of magnitude (the standardized beta, reported in the next to last row of Table 2). When
including both measures in the regression (column 3), genetic distance relative to the frontier
remains signicant while absolute genetic distance becomes insignicantly di¤erent from zero. In
terms of magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in FST genetic distance relative to the USA
is associated with an increase in the absolute di¤erence in log income per capita of almost 29% of
that variables standard deviation.
Column 4 of Table 2 reports results of IV estimation, using relative genetic distance to the Eng-
lish population in 1500 as an instrument for current genetic distance to the USA. This is meant to
21A myriad additional controls were included as robustness tests in analogous regressions presented in Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2009). These included climatic di¤erences, freight costs, etc. Results were robust to the inclusion of
these additional control variables.
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address two specic concerns: First, matching the 42 populations for which genetic distance data is
available to contemporaneous ethnolinguistic groups may introduce measurement error. The main
di¢ culties in the match arise for the New World where it is sometimes di¢ cult to assess which
European population to match with the descendents of past European settlers, which African pop-
ulations to match with former slaves, and what shares to ascribe to these various populations in
the total population, given that many of them mixed over time, resulting in signicant shares of
populations with mixed ancestry (the latter issue arises mainly in Latin America). In contrast, the
1500 match of genetic groups (populations) to the plurality ethnic group is much more straightfor-
ward, since the Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) data was gathered precisely to represent the makeup of
countries as they stood in 1492, prior to the population movements associated with the conquest
of the New World. The second concern is endogeneity: genetic distance between countries changed
in the post-1492 era due to the aforementioned conquest of the New World and the slave trades. It
is possible that areas well-suited to high incomes in the Industrial Era, perhaps due to geographic
factors such as a temperate climate, happened to attract certain populations (for instance Euro-
peans) as settlers. In this case, it would be the potential for di¤erential incomes that would causally
a¤ect genetic distance rather than the opposite. Using genetic distance lagged by 500 years as an
instrument addresses this particular endogeneity concern. The results presented in column 4 show
that, if anything, OLS understated the e¤ect of relative genetic distance: its standardized e¤ect
rises under IV to 46:49%. Since the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, to remain
conservative we rely in the rest of this chapter on OLS estimates.
4.1.2 Regional controls and analysis
In Table 3, we run a variety of regressions accounting for regional e¤ects. In column 1, we include
a full set of continental dummy variables capturing both whether the countries in a pair are both
located on the same specic continent (an e¤ect presumed to go in the direction of reducing the
di¤erence in economic performance between these countries) and whether they are located on
di¤erent ones (as further dened in the footnote to Table 3). The idea behind this test is to further
control for geographic factors not already captured by the included geographic distance variables.
However, this is a demanding test, since continent e¤ects could capture geographic barriers but
also part of the e¤ect of human barriers that could be mismeasured when using genetic distance.
Nonetheless, the e¤ect of genetic distance remains robust to controlling for a full set of twelve same-
and di¤erent-continent dummies. While the e¤ect of genetic distance falls in magnitude, it remains
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large and highly signicant statistically.
Columns 2 and 3 make use of the separate genetic distance dataset we have for 26 countries
in Europe. Here, the relevant measure of genetic distance is FST distance to the English (the
birthplace of the Industrial Revolution), though the results do not change if we use distance to
the Germans instead. We nd that within Europe, genetic distance is again a strong predictor of
absolute di¤erences in log per capita income. The standardized beta on genetic distance relative to
the English is of the same order of magnitude as that found in the world sample, and it is highly
signicant. There are two major genetic clines in Europe: one separating the North and the South,
another one separating the East and the West. These correspond to North-South and East-West
income di¤erences. Since the East-West cline overlaps to a large degree with regions that were
on either side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, to assess whether this historical feature
explains all of the e¤ect of genetic distance on economic performance we repeat our regression
using income in 1870 (from Maddison), well prior to the rise of the Eastern bloc. We nd that the
e¤ect of genetic distance is in fact larger in magnitude in the immediate aftermath of the Industrial
Revolution, with the standardized beta rising to almost 44%. This results assuages concerns that
the contemporary results were a result of the fact that the Iron Curtain as a rst approximation
separated Slavic from non-Slavic Europeans. It is also highly consistent with the barriers story
since, as we further explore below, the e¤ect of genetic distance should be larger around the time of
a large innovation, in the midst of the process whereby countries other than the frontier are busy
adopting the frontier technology in proportion to how genetically far they are from the frontier. In
sum, our e¤ects hold within Europe, where genetic distance is better measured.
Since the basic result of this chapter holds so strongly for Europe, might Europe drive the World
results? To test this, in column 4 we exclude any pairs of countries containing at least one European
country. Compared to the baseline results, the standardized e¤ect of genetic distance relative to
the USA declines from 30% to 25%, but remains large and statistically signicant - highlighting
that the results are not due to Europe alone. To drive home the point, in column 5 we control
for the absolute di¤erence in the share of the population of European descent, using data from the
Putterman and Weil (2010) migration matrix. The regression now controls more broadly for the
e¤ect of Europeanness, and while the e¤ect of the absolute di¤erence in the share of Europeans is
a positive and statistically signicant determinant of di¤erences in per capita income, its inclusion
in the regression only moderately reduces the standardized e¤ect of relative genetic distance (to
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27%). We conclude that our results are not driven by the inclusion of European countries in the
sample, nor are they driven by the genetic di¤erence between Europeans and the rest.
The nal geographic concern that we explore is whether Sub-Saharan Africa drives our results.
As Figure 2 illustrates, Sub-Saharan African populations are genetically distant from the rest of
the world: the Out of Africa migrations occurring about 70,000 years were the rst foray of modern
humans out of Africa, and consequently Africans and other world populations have had the longest
time to drift apart genetically from each other. Sub-Saharan populations also have some of the
lowest pre capita GDPs recorded in the world. While it is part of our story to ascribe some of the
poverty of Africa to the barriers to technological transmission brought about by its high degree of
genealogical distance from the rest of the world, it would be concerning if our results were entirely
driven by Sub-Saharan Africa. To address this concern, in column (6) of Table 3 we exclude any
pair that involves at least one Sub-Saharan country from our sample. We nd that the e¤ect of
genetic distance falls a little, but remains positive, statistically signicant, and large in magnitude
with a standardized beta equal to 17%. Together with the strong results within Europe, this should
lay to rest any notion that our results are driven solely by Sub-Saharan Africa.
4.1.3 Historical analysis
We now turn to a historical analysis of the determinants of aggregate measures of economic per-
formance, seeking to achieve two main goals. The rst is to assess the robustness of the e¤ect of
genetic distance through time. The second goal is to describe the time path of the standardized
e¤ect of genetic distance around the time of the Industrial Revolution. In our barriers model, a
major innovation such as the Industrial Revolution should lead to a specic pattern in the evolution
of the e¤ect of relative genetic distance on di¤erences in economic development. Specically, the
e¤ect of genetic distance should be large in the aftermath of the onset of the Industrial Revolution
in the frontier country. As more and more societies adopt the Industrial Revolution, the e¤ect
should gradually decline. We now redene the frontier country as the United Kingdom (i.e. the
English population) since it is a more appropriate choice for the period concerned.22
22This choice is not very material. In fact, relative genetic distance to the English and relative genetic distance
to the United States are very highly correlated, because the United States are primarily composed of populations
from Western Europe - either the English or populations genetically very close to the English. In fact, by world
standards genetic distances betweem Western European populations are so small that it matters little empirically
which Western European population is chosen as the frontier. For instance, for 1500 we experimented with using
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Table 4 displays pairwise correlations between historical measures of di¤erences in economic
development and genetic distance. For the 1500 period, we consider the correlation between relative
genetic distance to the English using the 1500 match, and population density. For periods from
1820 to today, it is best to rely on the correlation between contemporaneous weighted genetic
distance relative to the UK, and the absolute di¤erence in log per capita income at various dates.23
A few remarks are in order: First, this data reveals some persistence in economic fortunes. In
spite of being di¤erent measures, even the absolute di¤erence in population density in 1500 and
the absolute di¤erence in log per capita income in 2005 bear a correlation of about 12% with each
other. Correlations between income-based measures are much higher (for instance the correlation of
income di¤erences in 1820 and 2005 is 33%). Second, genetic distance is positively and signicantly
correlated with these measures of di¤erences in economic performance at all dates. For instance,
the correlation between the absolute di¤erence in population density in 1500 and relative genetic
distance to the English in 1500 is about 16%. This rises to 32% in 2005 (comparisons of magnitudes
should be made cautiously from this table as the underlying samples di¤ers by date - but in the
case of 1500 and 2005 the samples are very similar - more on this point below). In general, simple
correlations reveal that despite some changes in the relative fortunes of nations over the last 500
years, the correlation between genetic distance and development seems to exist at all dates.
Table 5 turns to regression analysis. Across all columns, corresponding to di¤erent dates,
genetic distance relative to the UK comes out with a positive, signicant coe¢ cient. Thus, the
e¤ect of genetic distance is robust to considering di¤erent dates and a di¤erent measure of economic
development for the Malthusian period. The penultimate row of Table 5 shows the evolution of
the standardized e¤ect of genetic distance over time for a common sample of 820 country pairs
(41 countries), for which income data is available at all dates. The magnitudes here are somewhat
smaller than when using unrestricted samples across periods, in part because the 41 countries only
include one Sub-Saharan African country (and that country is South Africa, which is relatively
rich). However, restricting the sample to pairs available at all dates allows for a comparison of
magnitudes across time. To facilitate interpretation, the standardized e¤ects from the common
Italy as the frontier country; results were unchanged.
23We lack genetic distance data suitable for the millenia prior to 1500, despite the existence of some population
density data for early dates. At any rate it is not clear that our barriers story would apply with as much force in
periods where geographic barriers to the di¤usion of innovation were so overwhelming, except perhaps in a regionally
narrow context.
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sample are displayed in Figure 5.
This gure lends further credence to the barriers model. Indeed, just as predicted above, the
e¤ect of genetic distance, which is initially modest in 1820, rises by around 75% to reach a peak
in 1913, and thereafter declines. Thus, in the few decades following the adoption of the Industrial
Revolution by countries in the (genetic) periphery of England, the e¤ect of genetic distance was
maximal. Thereafter, as more and more societies industrialized, the e¤ect fell steadily.
4.2 Results for specic innovations
The analysis above concerns determinants of di¤erences in aggregate productivity. This is useful
to analyze very broad trends like the di¤usion of the Industrial Revolution. Yet our model also
applies to the di¤usion of more specic technologies. Indeed, if our empirical results applied to
aggregate measures of development or technological sophistication only, but did not extend to
more disaggregated technologies, it would cast doubt on the hypothesis that the main e¤ect of
genetic distance is to hinder the transmission of technologies across societies with very di¤erent
cultures and histories. In this subsection, we use data directly at the technology usage level to
address this issue.
Table 6 starts with some summary statistics from the CEG dataset, pertaining to the con-
temporary period. Panel A is mainly meant to assist in the interpretation of the regressions that
come next, but Panel B already contains interesting information. The rst observation is that
di¤erences in the intensity of technology usage in 1970-2000 across various technological categories
are correlated, but imperfectly. Second, di¤erences in technology usage intensity are positively
correlated with per capita income, but the correlations are in the 0:4   0:7 range depending on
the technological category, so these variables do not all measure the same thing. In other words,
our measures of di¤erences in technology usage are not simply indicators of di¤erences in overall
economic performance. Third, di¤erences in technology usage are correlated more strongly with
genetic distance relative to the frontier than with genetic distance per se. In fact, correlations
with the latter are often close to zero while correlations with the former are always positive and
signicant.
Table 7 carries out the regression analysis for the contemporary period, controlling for geo-
graphic distance. Genetic distance relative to the frontier comes out positive in all cases, and sig-
nicant at the 5% level or better for 3 of the 4 technological categories, as well as for the summary
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index of overall technology usage. The only category for which genetic distance is not signicant
is agricultural technologies. One possible interpretation is that agricultural technologies, for the
contemporary period under consideration, have already widely di¤used around the globe and are
already intensively in use in much of the developing world, so that the e¤ect of genetic distance
as a barrier to their adoption can no longer be detected. We also carried out the same regression
analysis as that in Table 8, but adding to the specication the measure of absolute genetic distance
between pairs.24 We found that relative genetic distance always trumped absolute distance, which
sometimes carried a negative sign and was statistically insignicant in most cases. Thus, our test
of the barriers story (equation 30) also works when considering technology usage intensity rather
than aggregate measures of development.
Turning to the historical evidence, Table 8 examines the determinants of technology usage
di¤erences along the extensive margin in the year 1500. As before, we use the English population
as the frontier (as before, it matters little if we use the Italians instead - Italy was arguably the
most technologically sophisticated country in the world in 1500). For 1500 we have 5 rather than
4 technological categories, plus the overall index of technological sophistication. We nd that in
all cases, genetic distance relative to the English is positive and statistically signicant at the 10%
level. In 5 of the 6 columns, it is signicant at the 1% level (as before, the weakest results are for
agricultural technologies). This is remarkable given the crudeness of the measure of technological
use in 1500, based on counting whether or not each of 24 technologies, grouped in functional
categories, were in use at all in a given country at the time. Moreover, as before we also conducted
horseraces between relative genetic distance and absolute genetic distance.25 For ve of the six
indicators we again found that relative genetic distance trumps absolute genetic distance, with the
latter entering with either the wrong sign, a very small magnitude, or low signicance levels. The
only exception, once again, was for agriculture.
Finally, we carried out the same analysis with the 33 disaggregated technologies chosen from
the CHAT dataset. The results are presented in Table 9. For each technology, the table reports
the coe¢ cient on relative genetic distance to the USA (from a regression in which the standard set
of geographic controls are included), the number of observations and countries, the standardized
beta coe¢ cient on genetic distance, and the R2. The results vary across technologies of course, but
24Results are available upon request.
25Results are available upon request.
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interesting observations emerge: 1) In every single case the e¤ect of genetic distance on di¤erences
in technology usage intensity is positive. 2) In 22 of the 33 cases, the coe¢ cient on genetic distance
is signicant at the 10% level, and in 19 cases at the 5% level. 3) The e¤ect of genetic distance
is particularly strong for disaggregated agricultural technologies and industrial technologies, and
weakest for transportation and medical technologies. 4) The magnitude of the standardized e¤ects,
for those that are statistically signicant, vary from 8% to 24%, a bit smaller but roughly in line
with what we found using aggregate measured of productivity or the CEG dataset.26
A consideration of technologies at a more disaggregated data, rather than measures of overall
productivity at the economy-wide level, provides additional evidence that human barriers matter.
Not only is genetic distance relative to the frontier a strong predictor of technological usage dif-
ferences in 1500 and in the contemporary period, we also nd that it generally trumps absolute
genetic distance. The fact that genetic distance accounts for di¤erences in technological usage in-
dicates that our previous aggregate results might in large part be accounted for by hindrances to
the adoption of frontier technology brought about by historical separation between populations.
5 Ancestry and Long Run Development
In this section, we broaden the discussion of the role of ancestry as a determinant of the comparative
wealth of nations, building on the discussion in Spolaore andWacziarg (2013).27 Our basic argument
is that traits passed on across generations within societies play a fundamental role in accounting
for the persistence of economic fortunes. However, the specic way in which these traits operate
can take a variety of forms. In the model presented above, we argued that di¤erences in vertically-
transmitted traits introduced barriers to the di¤usion of innovations across nations. We found
much evidence that this was the case for aggregate productivity and for specic innovations going
back to the year 1500. However, we have not said much about what causes the onset of these
innovations. Other authors have pointed to a role for traits to bear a direct e¤ect on the onset
of major productivity enhancing innovations, broadly construed. We have also not said much
26We also conducted horseraces between absolute and relative genetic distance for each of the 33 disaggregated
technologies. Relative genetic distance remains positive and signicant in 17 of the 22 cases where relative genetic
distance is signicant at the 10% level when entered on its own. In the vast majority of cases, absolute genetic
distance enters insignicantly or with a negative sign.
27The discussion of the relation between cultural traits and economic outcomes is also drawn in part from Spolaore
(2014).
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about the nature and specic method of transmission of the traits that are thought to matter for
prosperity. These traits could be transmitted culturally, biologically, or through the interaction of
culture and biology.
We proceed in several steps. We start by briey describing the growing literature on long
run persistence in the wealth of nations. We argue that the intergenerational transmission of
traits has a lot to do with explaining long-run persistence, because traits are much more easily
transmitted across generations that across societies. That is, ancestry matters to explain the wealth
of nations. Next, we introduce a taxonomy to understand the manner in which ancestry matters.
In particular, we introduce a distinction between barrier e¤ects and direct e¤ects of vertical traits.
We also distinguish between the mode of transmission of the traits, either cultural, biological or
dual. Finally, we provide several examples from the recent literature illustrating the various ways
in which ancestry can matter.
5.1 Persistence and Reversals: The Role of Ancestry
Discussions of the long run roots of comparative development usually starts with geographic fac-
tors. A large literature has documented strong correlations between economic development and
geographic factors, for instance latitude, climate and the disease environment.28 The observation
that geographic factors are correlated with development was at the root of Diamonds 1997 book
on the long-run development advantage enjoyed by Eurasia - particularly Europe. On the surface,
geography is a convenient explanation for persistence, because geography does not change very
much, so that this immutable factor can be thought of as a prime reason for persistence in the
wealth of nations. This view, however, is overly simplistic, for at least two reasons: First, the
e¤ect of geography on economic outcome can change depending on the technology of production.
Geographic features useful to produce GDP in an agrarian economy may not be as helpful in an
industrial society. Second, the manner in which geographic factors a¤ect development today is
open to a variety of interpretations. The factors could operate directly (for instance a high disease
burden can reduce productivity) or have an indirect e¤ect through their historical legacy. While
both channels could be operative, the literature has increasingly moved in the latter direction.
28See, for instance: on climate and temperature, Myrdal (1968); Kamarck (1976); Masters and McMillan (2001);
Sachs (2001). On the disease environment: Bloom and Sachs (1998); Sachs, Mellinger and Gallup (2001); Sachs and
Malaney (2002). On natural resources: Sachs and Warner (2001).
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In fact, Jared Diamond (1997) pointed out early that geographic factors such as the shape of
continents and the availability of domesticable plants and animals probably did not have much to
do with current development directly. It is because these factors gave people from Eurasia an early
advantage in development, and because this advantage has persisted through the generations, that
Europeans were able to conquer the New World (and many parts of the old one) and to remain
at the top of the world distribution of income for a long time. This point became more widely
recognized since a pathbreaking paper by Acemoglu, Johson and Robinson (2002) where these
authors pointed out that the reversal of fortune experienced by former colonies between 1500 and
today was inconsistent with a simple, direct e¤ect of geography: for the geographic factors that
made countries poor ve hundred years ago should be expected to make them poor today still. And
yet fortunes were reversed among a signicant portion of the worlds countries. This paper pointed
to an indirect e¤ect of geography, operating through institutions: where Europeans settled, they
brought good institutions, and these are the fundamental proximate cause of development. Where
Europeans chose to exploit and extract, the institutions they bequeathed had negative e¤ects on
development.
Yet that interpretation, too, became the subject of debates. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer (2004), for instance, state: "the Europeans who settled in the New World may have
brought with them not so much their institutions, but themselves, that is, their human capital.
This theoretical ambiguity is consistent with the empirical evidence We would go even further:
Europeans who settled in the New World brought with them the whole panoply of vertically trans-
mitted traits - institutions, human capital, norms, values, preferences. This vector of vertical traits
was by denition easier to transmit to the descendents of Europeans than it was to convey to
colonized populations. This interpretation suggests an important role for ancestry, rather than
only institutions, as an explanation for the reversal of fortunes. Locations that were colonized
by Europeans and were previously characterized by low population density and the prevalence of
non-agrarian modes of subsistence became rich. Locations that were inhospitable to Europeans
remained poor, and Europeans remained at the top of the world distribution of aggregate produc-
tivity throughout.29 That the wealth of a nation seems so strongly a¤ected by the wealth of the
29We greatly expand on this point in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013). In that paper, we revisit the Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2002) evidence on the reversal of fortune. By examining the correlation between population
density in 1500 and per capita income today, we conrm their ndings for former colonies. Yet we also show that:
1) any evidence of a reversal of fortune disappears when European countries are included in the sample; 2) there
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ancestors of those living in that nation suggests a central role for vertically transmitted traits as
an explanation for both long-run persistence and the current distribution of income.
This interpretation led various authors to focus explicitly on persistence and ancestry. First
came our own work on genetic distance as a barrier to development, already discussed in the
previous sections (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). Next came important papers by Putterman and
Weil (2010) and Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010). These papers also explore the deep historical
roots of current development.
Putterman and Weil (2010) look at two important determinants of the current wealth of na-
tions: experience with agriculture, measured by the time elapsed since the adoption of sedentary
agriculture as a primary means of food production; and experience with a centralized state, mea-
sured by the number of years a country has experienced centralized governance, discounting years
that occurred farther in the past. Both variables are predictors of todays per capita income, but
they enter even more strongly when they are adjusted for ancestry. To adjust variables for ancestry,
Putterman and Weil construct a migration matrix. In this matrix, a row pertains to a country, and
columns contain the fraction of that countrys population whose ancestors in 1500 lived in each
of the worlds countries. For the Old World, entries are mostly diagonal: that is, the ancestors of
the French mostly lived in France in 1500. For the New World, however, the ancestors of current
populations are often in signicant numbers from other continents altogether - primarily Euro-
pean countries for European colonizers, and Sub-Saharan African countries for the descendants of
former slaves. By premultiplying a variable by the migration matrix, one obtains this variables
ancestry-adjusted counterpart. For instance, for Australia the history of the location is the history
of the Aborigenes, while the history of the current population is mostly the history of the English.
Putterman and Weils major contribution is to show that ancestry-adjusted years of agriculture
and ancestry-adjusted state centralization are much stronger predictors of current income than
their non-ancestry adjusted counterparts. This suggests an important role, again, for traits that
are passed on intergenerationally within populations.
Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) take a di¤erent approach, but reach a similar conclusion: they
show that the degree of technological sophistication of countries is highly autocorrelated even at
is evidence of persistence among countries that were not former European colonies; 3) persistence is even stronger
when looking at countries that are populated mostly by their indigenous populations. These facts are suggestive of
a strong role for ancestry as an explanation for persistence.
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very long horizons: they detect correlations between current technological usage levels (measured
along the intensive margin in the current period) and technological usage as far back as the year
1,000 BC (measured along the extensive margin for a set of 12 ancient technologies). Current per
capita income is also correlated strongly with past technological sophistication in the years 1,000
BC, 1 AD and 1500 AD. In this case, a history of technological advancement predicts current
income and technological advancement, an indication of persistence. The crucial point, however,
is again that when the historical (lagged) variables are entered in their ancestry-adjusted forms,
they are much stronger predictors of current outcomes than variables that capture the history of a
location. In this context also, there appears to be a strong role for ancestry and intergenerational
transmission as explanations for the persistence in technology and income levels.
Why does ancestry matter? In what follows we present a taxonomy of the possible e¤ects of
vertically transmitted traits on growth and development. This taxonomy is summarized in the
following matrix:
Mode of Operation  !
Mode of Transmission #
Direct E¤ect Barrier E¤ect
Biological Transmission
(genetic and/or epigenetic)
Quadrant I Quadrant IV
Cultural Transmission
(behavioral and/or symbolic)
Quadrant II Quadrant V
Dual Transmission
(biological-cultural interaction)
Quadrant III Quadrant VI
.
5.2 Modes of Transmission
The inheritance of traits from one generation to the next in humans takes place through several
modes of transmission and along multiple dimensions. Recent scientic advances stress the com-
plexity of di¤erent inheritance mechanisms (for example, see Jablonka and Lamb, 2005) which
interact with each other as well as with environmental and societal factors. For simplicity, in our
taxonomy we focus on three broad categories: biological transmission, cultural transmission, and
the interaction of biological and cultural transmission (dual transmission)
Biological transmission includes genetic transmission. Individuals inherit nuclear DNA from
their parents. Humans also inherit mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) only from their mothers Mito-
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chondrial DNA codes for the genes of the cell structures which convert food into useable energy,
while nuclear DNA codes for the rest of the human genome. The measures of genetic distance
used previously in this chapter are based on di¤erences in the distribution of nuclear DNA across
populations - that is, on di¤erences in DNA inherited from both parents. As already mentioned,
genetic distance is based on neutral genes, which change randomly and are not a¤ected by natural
selection. Other parts of the DNA code for genes that are a¤ected by natural selection, such as
those a¤ecting eye color or skin color. All these traits are transmitted biologically.
However, genetic transmission is not the only form of biological transmission. In recent years
biologists have also given much attention to epigenetic inheritance systems. Epigenetics refers to
the mechanisms through which cells with the same genetic information (i.e., DNA) acquire di¤erent
phenotypes (i.e., observable characteristics) and transmit them to their daughter cells. Examples
of epigenetic markers are methylation patterns: DNA methylation is a biochemical process that
stably alters the expression of genes in cells by adding a methyl group to a DNA nucleotide. There
is currently a debate in the scientic literature about the extent to which epigenetic changes can
be inherited from one generation to the next - for instance, see Chandler and Alleman (2008) and
Morgan and Whitelaw (2008). An example of possible intergenerational epigenetic inheritance,
mentioned by Morgan and Whitelaw (2008), is the Dutch Famine Birth Cohort Study by Lumey
(1992), reporting that children born during famine in World War II were smaller than average
and that the e¤ects could last two generations (but see also Stein and Lumey, 2002). In principle,
epigenetic mechanisms could explain rapid biological changes in populations that could not be due
to genetic selection. Epigenetic mechanisms have recently been emphasized by microeconomists
working on human capital formation, such as Cunha and Heckman (2007, p. 32), who wrote:
"the nature versus nurture distinction is obsolete. The modern literature on epigenetic expression
teaches us that the sharp distinction between acquired skills and ability featured in the early human
capital literature is not tenable."
Of course, biological inheritance is not the only mode of intergenerational transmission of traits
across human beings. Many traits are transmitted culturally from one generation to the next. An
important example is the specic language that each child acquires through learning and imitation,
usually (but not necessarily) from parents or other close relatives. Other cultural traits include
values, habits, and norms. In general, culture is a broad concept, which encompasses a vast range
of traits that are not transmitted biologically across generations. The Websters Encyclopedic
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Unabdidged Dictionary denes culture as including the behaviours and beliefs characteristic of
a particular social, ethnic or age group and the total ways of living built up by a group of
human beings and transmitted from one generation to the other.Richerson and Boyd (2005, p.
5), two leading scholars in the eld of cultural evolution, dene culture as "information capable
of a¤ecting individualsbehavior that they acquire from other members of their species through
teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission."
Following Jablonka and Lamb (2005), we can distinguish between two forms of cultural trans-
mission, both involving social learning: behavioral transmission and symbolic transmission. Be-
havioral transmission takes place when individuals learn from each other by direct observation and
imitation. Symbolic transmission instead is about learning by means of systems of symbols - for
example, by reading books. Most scholars of human evolution believe that the bulk of observed hu-
man variation in intergenerationally transmitted traits is mainly due to cultural transmission rather
than to biological transmission. For instance, prominent anthropologists Henrich and McElreath
(2003, p. 123) write: "While a variety of local genetic adaptations exist within our species, it seems
certain that the same basic genetic endowment produces arctic foraging, tropical horticulture, and
desert pastoralism [...]. The behavioral adaptations that explain the immense success of our species
are cultural in the sense that they are transmitted among individuals by social learning and have
accumulated over generations. Understanding how and when such culturally evolved adaptations
arise requires understanding of both the evolution of the psychological mechanisms that underlie
human social learning and the evolutionary (population) dynamics of cultural systems."
In sum, our classication of modes of intergenerational transmission includes two broad cate-
gories: biological transmission (both genetic and epigenetic) and cultural transmission (behavioral
and symbolic). However, these two forms of transmission should not be viewed as completely dis-
tinct and independent. On the contrary, a growing line of research stresses that human evolution
often proceeds from the interaction between biological and cultural inheritance systems, where each
system is inuenced by the other system. According to Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 194), genes
and culture can be seen as "obligate mutualists, like two species that synergistically combine their
specialized capacities to do things that neither can do alone. [. . . ] Genes, by themselves cant
readily adapt to rapidly changing environments. Cultural variants, by themselves, cant do any-
thing without brains and bodies. Genes and culture are tightly coupled but subject to evolutionary
forces that tug behavior in di¤erent directions." This approach to evolution is known as dual in-
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heritance theory or gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1976, 1981; Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). In such a framework, observable human outcomes can
be viewed as stemming from the interplay of genetically and culturally transmitted traits. A well-
known example of gene-culture coevolution is the spread of the gene controlling lactose absorption
in adults in response to cultural innovations, such as domestication and dairying (Simoons, 1969,
1970; Richerson and Boyd, 2005, chapter 6). The ability to digest milk as an adult (i.e., to be
"lactase persistent") is given by a gene that is unequally distributed among di¤erent populations:
it is prevalent among populations of European descent, but very rare among East Asians and com-
pletely absent among Native Americans. It is well-understood that such gene did spread rapidly
after the introduction of domestication among populations that kept milk-producing animals, such
as cows or goats, reinforcing the advantages from those practices from an evolutionary perspective.
In general, dual inheritance - the third "mode of transmission" in our taxonomy - captures such a
complex interaction between genetic and cultural factors.
5.3 Modes of Operation
Traits can be transmitted from one generation to the next biologically, culturally, or through the
interaction of genes and culture (dual transmission). But how do such traits a¤ect economic
outcomes? Our taxonomy distinguishes between direct e¤ects and barrier e¤ects.
Direct E¤ects. Most of the economic literature has focused on direct e¤ects of vertically trans-
mitted traits on income and productivity. Such e¤ects occur when individuals inherit traits that
directly impact economic performance, either positively or negatively. For example, most contri-
butions on the relation between cultural values and economic development stress inherited norms
and beliefs that directly lead to positive or negative economic outcomes. Max Weber (1905), the
great German sociologist and political economist, in his classic book The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, provided a systematic and inuential study emphasizing the direct positive
e¤ects of specic culturally transmitted traits on economic performance. Weber was in part re-
acting to the Marxist view, which considered cultural beliefs and values, such as religion, as the
by-product of underlying economic factors. Instead, Max Weber argued for direct causal e¤ects of
culturally transmitted traits on economic outcomes. Specically, he proposed that the emergence
of a new Protestant ethic, which linked good worksto predestination and salvation, had a direct
e¤ect on the rising of the spirit of capitalism, a new attitude towards the pursuit of economic
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prosperity. Among Webers more recent followers is, for example, the economic historian David
Landes (1998, 2000), who titled one of his contributions Culture Makes Almost All the Di¤er-
ence,and opened it with the line "Max Weber was right.Landesemphasis was also on the direct
economic e¤ects of culture, dened as the inner values and attitudes that guide a population.
According to Landes (p. 12): This is not to say that Webers ideal typeof capitalist could be
found only among Calvinists [. . . ]. People of all faiths and no faith can grow up to be rational,
diligent, orderly, productive, clean, and humourless. [. . . ] Webers argument, as I see it, is that in
sixteenth- to eighteenth-century northern Europe, religion encouraged the appearance in numbers
of a personality type that had been exceptional and adventitious before and that this type created
a new economy (a new mode of production) that we know as (industrial) capitalism.
An extensive empirical literature has attempted to directly test Webers hypotheses, often
concluding with a negative assessment of direct e¤ects of Protestant values on economic outcomes.
Recent contributors to this literature were Sascha Becker and Ludger Woessman (2009), who used
county-level data from nineteenth century Prussia, and attempted to estimate the causal e¤ect of
Protestantism on economic performance by exploiting the fact that the Lutheran Reform expanded
concentrically from Wittenberg, Martin Luthers city. They concluded that Protestantism fostered
economic development, but that the main channel was not the spread of a new work ethic associated
with religious values, but the expansion of literacy as a consequence of education in reading the
Bible.
The direct e¤ects of religious beliefs on economic outcomes were investigated empirically by
Barro and McCleary (2003). Barro and McClearly used instrumental variables, such as the existence
of a state religion and of a regulated market structure, to identify the direct e¤ect of religion on
growth. They concluded that economic growth is positively associated with the extent of religious
beliefs, such as those in hell and heaven, but negatively associated to church attendance. They
interpreted their results as consistent with a direct e¤ect of religion - a culturally transmitted set
of beliefs - on individual characteristics that foster economic performance. Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2003) also studied the e¤ects of religious beliefs on economic attitudes and outcomes,
such as cooperation, legal rules, thriftiness, the market economy, and female labor participation.
They found that religious beliefs tend to be associated with attitudes conducive to higher income
per capita and higher economic growth, and that the e¤ects di¤er across religious denominations.
While scholars such as Weber have stressed the positive direct e¤ects of cultural traits, such as
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the Protestant ethic, other scholars have argued that specic culturally transmitted traits and values
can be responsible for economic backwardness and underdevelopment. An inuential and widely
debated example of this view was provided by the political scientist Edward Baneld (1958) in his
classic book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, written in collaboration with his wife Laura
Fasano, and based on their visit to the Southern Italian town of Chiaromonte (called Montegrano
in the book). Baneld argued that the economic backwardness of that society could be partly
explained by the direct e¤ects of inherited values summarized by the term amoral familism," and
consisting in a lack of mutual trust and cooperation, and a disregard for the interests of fellow
citizens who were not part of ones immediate family. A theory of intergenerational transmission
directly inspired by Banselds analysis has been provided recently by Guido Tabellini (2008), who
also built on Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdiers (2000, 2001) seminal work on the economics
of cultural transmission. In Tabellinis model, parents choose which values to transmit to their
children, depending on the patterns of external enforcement and expected future transactions. In
particular, Tabellini shows that path dependence is possible: adverse initial conditions can lead
to a unique equilibrium where legal enforcement is weak and inherited cultural values discourage
cooperation.
A recent example of an empirical study of the direct e¤ects of inherited traits on economic
growth is Algan and Cahuc (2010). Algan and Cahuc document how the level of inherited trust
of descendants of immigrants in the United States is signicantly inuenced by the country of
origin and the timing of arrival of their ancestors. They then use the inherited trust of descendants
of immigrants in the US as a time-varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin,
in order to identify the impact of inherited trust on growth, controlling for country xed e¤ects.
Algan and Cahuc nd that changes in inherited trust during the 20th century have a large impact
on economic development in a panel of 24 countries.
The above-mentioned contributions are examples of a much larger literature on the direct e¤ects
of cultural traits on economic outcomes. There is also a smaller but important literature that has
extended the analysis to traits that are transmitted biologically, or stem from the interaction of
genes and culture (dual inheritance). An example is the contribution by Galor and Moav (2002),
who modeled an intergenerationally transmitted trait a¤ecting humansfertility strategies. They
posited that some individuals inherited traits that induced them to follow a quantity-biased strat-
egy, consisting in the generation of a higher number of children, while other individuals followed
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a quality-biased strategy, consisting in the investment of more resources in a smaller number of
o¤spring. Galor and Moav argued that the evolutionary dynamics of these traits had direct impli-
cations for the onset of the Industrial Revolution and the following demographic transition. In the
preindustrial world, caught in a Malthusian trap, selective pressures favored parental investment,
which led to higher productivity. In their model, the spread of this inherited predilection for a
smaller number of children led endogenously to the transition out of the Malthusian regime. Galor
and Moav in their contribution stressed biological transmission. However, their analysis can also
be interpreted as a model of cultural transmission of traits inuencing fertility strategies, or as the
outcome of the interaction of biological and cultural traits.
A more recent contribution that stresses the direct e¤ects of di¤erent distributions of inter-
generationally transmitted traits on economic development is Ashraf and Galor (2013a). In that
study, Ashraf and Galor focus on genetic diversity. While genetic distance refers to genetic di¤er-
ences between populations, genetic diversity is about heterogeneity within populations. In their
study, Ashraf and Galor (2013a) document a non-monotonic relationship between genetic diversity
and development, and argue that such relation is causal, stemming from a trade-o¤ between the
benecial and the detrimental e¤ects of diversity of traits on productivity. Again, while the focus
of Ashraf and Galors empirical analysis is on genetic variables, the modes of transmission from
intergenerational traits to economic outcomes can operate both through biological and cultural
channels, and their interactions. A further discussion of the relation between genetic diversity and
ethnic and cultural fragmentation is provided by Ashraf and Galor (2013b).
The interaction of culture and genes is explicitly at the center of the economic analysis of
the e¤ecst of lactase persistence provided by Justin Cook (2012). Cook argues that country-level
variation in the frequency of lactase persistence is positively and signicantly related to economic
development in pre-modern times - which he measures by using population density in 1500 CE,
as we did earlier in this chapter. Specically, he nds that an increase in one standard deviation
in the frequency of lactase persistent individuals (roughly 24 percentage points) is associated with
a 40 percent increase in pre-modern population density. Cook uses instrumental variables (solar
radiation) to assess causality, and interprets his results as reecting the direct e¤ects of inherited
cultural and biological traits associated with the introduction of dairying.
Barrier e¤ects. As we already mentioned, most of the contributions on the relation between
ancestry and economic performance, including the examples mentioned above, tend to focus on
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the direct e¤ects of intergenerationally transmitted traits on economic outcomes. However, as we
emphasized in the theoretical and empirical analysis presented in the rst sections of this chapter,
di¤erences in inherited traits can also a¤ect comparative development by acting as barriers to the
di¤usion of goods, services, ideas and innovations. A focus on barriers can explain why di¤erences
in inherited traits may matter, even though many new ideas and innovations are learned "hori-
zontally," from individuals and populations that are not directly related, rather than "vertically,"
from ones close relatives and ancestors. The fact is that, when barrier e¤ects do exist, vertically
transmitted traits also a¤ect horizontal learning and di¤usion. People are more likely to learn new
ideas and adopt new technologies from other people who, while not directly related to them, share
more recent common ancestors and, consequently, also share on average a larger set of inherited
traits and characteristics.
The literature on the barrier e¤ects of vertically transmitted traits is not as large as the one
on direct e¤ects. In addition to our own contributions, already discussed, a recent example is
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), who studied the barrier e¤ects of cultural traits by using
data on bilateral trust between European countries. They found that bilateral trust is a¤ected by
cultural aspects of the match between trusting country and trusted country, such as their history
of conicts and their religious, genetic, and somatic similarities. Lower bilateral trust then acts as
a cultural barrier: it is associated with less bilateral trade, less portfolio investment, and less direct
investment between the two countries, even after controlling for other characteristics of the two
countries. These ndings suggest that culturally transmitted traits can have a signicant barrier
e¤ect on economic interactions between di¤erent societies.
Another study that documents the e¤ects of cultural barriers on trade is provided by Gabriel
Felbermayr and Farid Toubal (2010). Felbermayr and Toubal measure cultural proximity or dis-
tance between countries using bilateral score data from the Eurovision Song Contest, a popular
European television show. For instance, viewers in Cyprus award Greek singers more points on av-
erage than the Greeks receive from viewers in other countries, and vice versa. In contrast, Cypriot
and Turkish viewers give each other below-average scores. Felbermayr and Toubal exploit the vari-
ation of these scores within-pair and across time to estimate the e¤ects of cultural proximity on
bilateral trade, nding signicant e¤ects.
An open question concerns the relationship between direct and barrier e¤ects. Of course, in
principle both modes of operation can be at work simultaneously, and some specic traits can play
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a role along both channels. For example, populations that inherit values and beliefs that make
them more open to risk and innovation could benet directly from such traits, but may also face
lower barriers to interactions with other groups. In general, the study of barrier e¤ects stemming
from historical and cultural divergence is a promising area of research, still in its infancy, both from
a theoretical and empirical perspective. The taxonomy and discussion presented in this chapter are
only a rst step towards a more complete understandiing of this important topic.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we provided a theoretical framework and empirical evidence to shed light on a
fundamental question: What barriers prevent the di¤usion of the most productive technologies
from the technological frontier to less developed economies?
In the rst part of this chapter, we presented a simple analytical framework to illustrate two basic
ideas. The rst idea was that genetic distance between populations, which measures their degree
of genealogical relatedness, can be interpreted as a summary metric for average di¤erences in traits
that are transmitted with variation from one generation to the next. We modeled the transmission
of such "vertical" traits - that is, the transmission of characteristics which are passed on vertically
across generations within a population over the very long run - and derived the relation between
divergence in vertical traits and genetic distance. The second idea was that di¤erences in vertically
transmitted traits act as obstacles to horizontal learning and imitation across di¤erent populations.
We argued that populations that share a more recent common history and are therefore closer in
terms of vertical traits tend to face lower costs and barriers to adopting each others technological
innovations.
In the second part of this chapter we brought these ideas to the data. We introduced measures
of genetic distance between populations, and used them to test our barrier model of di¤usion. We
found that, as the model predicts, genetic distance measured relative to the worlds technological
frontier trumps absolute genetic distance as an explanation for bilateral income di¤erences and
for the di¤erent usage of specic technological innovations. This was the case both historically,
when we measured technological usage on the extensive margin, and for more recent technological
developments, when we measured technological usage along the intensive margin. We also docu-
mented that, as implied by our model, the e¤ect of genetic distance was more pronounced after a
major innovation, such as the onset of the Industrial Revolution, and declined as more populations
41
adopted the frontiers innovation. Overall, we found considerable evidence that barriers introduced
by historical separation between populations have played a key role in the di¤usion of technological
innovations and economic growth.
In the third and nal part of this chapter, we discussed our hypotheses and results within the
broader context of the growing literature on the deep historical roots of economic development.
To organize our discussion we presented a taxonomy based on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013). The
taxonomy provided a conceptual basis for discussing how intergenerationally transmitted traits
could conceivably a¤ect economic outcomes. Our taxonomy distinguished possible economic e¤ects
of vertical traits along two dimensions. The rst dimension referred to the mode of transmission of
vertical traits, which could be biological (genetic or epigenetic), cultural (behavioral or symbolic), or
resulting from the interaction of genes and culture (dual inheritance). The second dimension dened
the mode of operation of these traits, depending on whether they have direct e¤ects on economic
outcomes, or operate as barriers to economic interactions between populations. We briey reviewed
examples of economic contributions that focused on di¤erent e¤ects - direct e¤ects or barrier e¤ects
- of traits transmitted biologically, culturally, or through dual transmission. We argued that most
of the literature so far has mainly focused on direct e¤ects, while much less attention has been given
to the study of barriers to development stemming from long-term cultural and historical divergence.
The topic of human barriers introduced by historical divergence and their e¤ects on social,
political and economic outcomes is an exciting emerging eld of study. Our own work continues to
explore the e¤ects of variation in human relatedness on a variety of political economy outcomes.
For instance, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2012b) examines the e¤ects of genealogical relatedness on the
propensity for interstate militarized conict, nding that a smaller genetic distance is associated
with a signicantly higher probability of a bilateral conict between two countries. This e¤ect,
again, is interpreted as evidence of a barrier between societies characterized by distinct norms,
values, preferences and cultures. This time, however, the barrier impedes a costly rather than a
benecial interaction. In ongoing work, we explore the e¤ects of relatedness on trade and nancial
ows across countries. Finally, we have recently begun an e¤ort to better characterize what ge-
netic relatedness captures, by investigating the relationship between various measures of cultural
di¤erences and genetic distance - the goal being to more clearly identify the source of the barriers
introduced by a lack of genealogical relatedness. For instance, the barriers could take the form of
a lack of trust, di¤erences in preferences or norms, or transactions costs linked to an inability to
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communicate and coordinate. This chapter provides only an introduction and rst step towards a
more comprehensive and systematic analysis of such important, unexplored, and promising topics.
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Appendix 1 - Technologies used in the various datasets
A. 24 Technologies in the CEG 1500 AD Dataset.
1. Military : Standing army, cavalry, rearms, muskets, eld artillery, warfare capable ships, heavy
naval guns, ships (+180 guns).
2. Agriculture: Hunting and gathering, pastoralism, hand cultivation, plough cultivation.
3. Transportation : Ships capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean, ships capable of crossing the
Pacic Ocean, ships capable of reaching the Indian Ocean, wheel, magnetic compass, horse powered
vehicles.
4. Communications: Movable block printing, woodblock or block printing, books, paper.
5. Industry : Steel, iron.
B. 9 Technologies in the CEG 2000 AD Dataset.
Electricity (in 1990), Internet (in 1996), PCs (in 2002), cell phones (in 2002), telephones (in 1970),
cargo and passenger aviation (in 1990), trucks (in 1990), cars (in 1990), tractors (in 1970).
C. 33 Technologies in the CHAT dataset for 1990-1999.
1. Agriculture: Harvest machines, tractors used in agriculture, metric tons of fertilizer consumed,
area of irrigated crops, share of cropland area planted with modern varieties (% cropland), metric
tons of pesticides.
2. Transportation: civil aviation passenger km, lengths of rail line, tons of freight carried on
railways, passenger cars in use and commercial vehicles in use.
3. Medical : Hospital beds, DPT immunization before age 1, measles immunization before age 1.
4. Communications: Cable TV, cell phones, personal computers, access to the Internet, items
mailed/received, newspaper circulation, radios, telegrams sent, mainline telephone lines, television
sets in use.
5. Industry and other : Output of electricity, KwHr, automatic looms, total looms, crude steel
production in electric arc furnaces, weight of articial (cellulosic) bers used in spindles, weight
of synthetic (non cellulosic) bers used in spindles, weight of all types of bers used in spindles,
visitor beds available in hotels and elsewhere, visitor rooms available in hotels and elsewhere.
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics for the Main Variables of Interest 
 
 
Panel A - Mean and Variation 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Difference in log income per 
capita 2005  
1.3844 0.9894 0.0000241 4.8775
FST genetic distance relative 
to the English, 1500 
0.0710 0.0555 0 0.2288
Weighted FST genetic 
distance relative to the USA  
0.0612 0.0475 0 0.2127
Weighted FST genetic 
distance between pairs  
0.1124 0.0818 0 0.3364
Geodesic distance (thousands 
of km) 
7.1349 4.1330 0.0105 19.9512
(10,440 observations) 
 
 
 
Panel B - Correlations  
 
 Difference in 
log income 
per capita 
2005 
FST genetic 
distance 
relative to the 
English, 1500
Weighted 
FST gen. dist. 
relative to the 
USA 
Weighted 
FST genetic 
distance 
between pairs
FST genetic distance relative 
to the English, 1500 
0.2745* 1  
Weighted FST genetic 
distance relative to the USA  
0.3226* 0.6105* 1 
Weighted FST genetic 
distance between pairs  
0.1950* 0.2408* 0.5876* 1
Geodesic distance (thousands 
of km) 
0.0126 0.0644* 0.0899* 0.3317*
(*: significant at the 5% level. 10,440 observations) 
  
50 
 
Table 2 - Income difference regressions 
(Dependent variable: Difference in log per capita income, 2005) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS with 
relative GD 
OLS with 
simple GD 
Horserace 
between 
simple and 
relative GD 
2SLS with 
1500 GD 
FST gen. dist. relative to  6.290 6.029 9.720
the USA, weighted (1.175)*** (1.239)*** (1.974)***
FST genetic distance 2.164 0.275 
 (0.596)*** (0.541) 
Absolute difference in  0.232 0.559 0.255 0.152
latitudes (0.245) (0.279)** (0.248) (0.300)
Absolute difference in  -0.025 -0.196 -0.007 0.238
longitudes (0.220) (0.240) (0.213) (0.247)
Geodesic Distance -0.012 -0.008 -0.016 -0.042
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028)
=1 for contiguity -0.418 -0.495 -0.414 -0.326
 (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.061)*** (0.069)***
=1 if either country is  0.174 0.143 0.174 0.211
an island (0.083)** (0.083)* (0.083)** (0.084)***
=1 if either country is  0.008 0.024 0.005 -0.029
landlocked (0.085) (0.090) (0.087) (0.085)
=1 if pair shares at least  -0.001 0.028 -0.000 -0.024
one sea or ocean (0.067) (0.077) (0.067) (0.078)
Constant 1.022 1.143 1.017 0.891
 (0.089)*** (0.086)*** (0.090)*** (0.099)***
Standardized Beta (%) 30.18 10.39 28.93 46.49
R-Squared 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.09
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All regressions are based on 10,440 observations.    
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Figure 2 - Genetic distance among 42 populations.  
Source: Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994. 
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